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The Unresolvable ‘Russian Question’: The Role of the Soviet 
Legacy and Post-Communist Realities 
 
Vera Tolz 
 
Many... citizens of Russia (rossiiskie grazhdane) do not appreciate the 
fact that the Russia which emerged [after the collapse of the USSR] is 
not just about new borders. [Are we witnessing] the creation of a new 
ethno-cultural Russian nation (russkaia natsiia) or a civic Russian 
nation (rossiiskaia natsiia)? Or both? … Some would think that these 
questions have no relevance to our everyday life, yet the disintegration 
of the USSR demonstrates that sometimes the presence or absence of 
answers to these abstract questions determine our life for years to 
come.1 
 
This observation made in 2005 by a Russian journalist, Aleksandr Mekhanik, continues to 
capture the dilemma that has been facing Russia since 1991. It was Russia’s second president, 
Vladimir Putin, who took up the project of nation-building (the construction of a compound 
national identity) particularly seriously. The restoration of Russia as a great power was 
identified by Putin as a key goal upon his rise to supreme power in 1999. It was to be achieved, 
among other things, through the articulation and dissemination of a particular discourse of 
nation-building. The ways of coping with the country’s ethnic and confessional heterogeneity 
and of addressing historically rooted ambiguities of the position of ethnic Russians, which the 
Putin administration has articulated, have been, in some aspects, novel and, in others, 
determined by the legacy of the Soviet policies and the developments of the 1990s.  
This article looks at the state of the ‘Russian question’ (the place and role of ethnic Russians 
within the Soviet and Russian state; the political leaders’ approaches to the construction of 
Russian identity(ies) and popular perceptions of Russian nationhood) since 1917, paying 
particular attention to the dynamics of Russian nation-building since 2000.  
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Historical background 
 
In his assessment of the dilemmas facing the Putin administration in the sphere of nation-
building, Mekhanik rightly noted the importance of the Soviet legacy. Indeed, the Soviet 
nationalities policies and the Soviet understanding of the terms nation (narod, natsiia), 
nationality (natsionalnost) and ethnicity (etnos, etnicheskaia prinadlezhnost) have been 
exercising a formative impact on how the elites and the peoples of the newly independent states 
of the former USSR, Russians included, have been defining their new nationhoods.   
The formative feature of the Soviet nationalities policies was, in Rogers Brubaker’s words, 
an ‘unprecedented, thoroughgoing institutionalization’ of territorial nationhood and ethnic 
nationality at the sub-state level, as the Bolshevik leadership carved up the state into numerous 
national territories, each defined as the homeland of and for a particular ethnonational group. 
The regime also divided the peoples of the Soviet state into mutually exclusive ethnic 
nationalities, turning an ethnically understood nationality into a fundamental form of social 
accounting. At the same time, the focus on system maintenance through a strong vertical power 
line running from Moscow to the peripheries and the discouragement of horizontal ties between 
the state’s individual administrative units weakened the formation of an over-arching Soviet 
identity. Even though the Soviet leadership suppressed the manifestations of political 
nationalism in the constituent republics of the USSR, the nationalities policies nevertheless laid 
the basis for the country’s eventual disintegration, as they inadvertently created a political 
environment highly conducive to ethno-cultural nationalism detrimental to state unity.2  
The status of the Russians in the multi-national Soviet state was acknowledged by the 
Bolsheviks as problematic already in 1922. How could the Russians – a dominant nationality 
in the tsarist empire – fit within the multi-national Soviet state, all of whose nationalities were 
proclaimed to be equal by the Bolsheviks. One of the proposals was to create an ethnic Union 
Russian republic with the institutional structures identical to those introduced for the major 
non-Russian nationalities, but it was rejected by Stalin on the grounds that such a Russian 
republic (particularly if a separate Communist Party were to be established there) would pose 
too strong a challenge to the central leadership and that it would stimulate the rise of Russian 
nationalism, a force widely perceived at the time as threatening to the non-Russians. Instead, 
within the Soviet Union, the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was set up 
as a multi-ethnic federation, whose entire territory was permeated by national institutions for 
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non-Russian minorities. The national self-expression of the Russians was suppressed, and the 
Russians were stigmatised as the oppressor-nation.3  Not only members of the anti-Soviet 
Russian intelligentsia, but also regional Russian party leaders complained about ‘the anti-
Russian nature’ of these policies.4 
The impact of the Bolshevik policies on Russia and the Russians preoccupied not only those 
who stayed at home. Numerous people, including famous intellectuals and former politicians, 
left the country voluntarily or otherwise at the time of the radical upheavals engendered by the 
war and the revolution.  Abroad they continued to debate the plight of their country, expressing 
views ranging from pro-Soviet to monarchist, from liberal democratic to highly authoritarian. 
In this heterogeneous context of exile, a set of proposals about how the Russian state should be 
organised, which still continue to be influential, was formulated by the émigré movement, the 
Eurasians. Postulating that a unique Eurasian, neither European nor Asian, civilisation had been 
formed through centuries of interaction between the peoples of the former Russian empire, the 
Eurasians argued that the peoples of ‘Russia-Eurasia’ should possess a simultaneous sense of 
belonging to their own culturally defined national groups and to the overarching pan-Eurasian 
nation. The Eurasians acknowledged the equality of all the nationalities of ‘Russia-Eurasia’, 
yet they still insisted on a special status of ethnic Russians and favoured Orthodoxy above other 
religions.5 In developing their thinking about how to maintain the state unity, the Eurasians 
responded directly to the Soviet policies. In the 1920s, the Eurasians shared with the Bolsheviks 
the perception of danger posed by exclusive ethnic Russian nationalism to the state unity, yet 
they criticized the Bolsheviks for failing to pay sufficient attention to fostering a compound 
identity which would be shared by all nationalities of the state.6 
In the 1930s, changing domestic priorities and the new international context led to the 
revision of the earlier Soviet approach to the nationalities question. It is significant for our 
understanding of the subsequent dynamics of the Russian nation-building that the formative 
years, in terms of providing long-lasting institutional arrangements for the Russians within the 
Soviet state and of articulating dominant interpretations of Russian history and culture for 
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effective dissemination among a population exposed for the first time to mass state-sponsored 
education, were during the Stalin period. The most significant policy change to be implemented 
from 1932 onwards was the rethinking of the status of the Russians and the reorganisation of 
the RSFSR. In the areas of the federation which were predominantly populated by ethnic 
Russians the non-Russian national institutions were dissolved and, thus, Russian national space 
was created. Some non-Russian minorities maintained their national autonomies within the 
RSFSR in the form of autonomous republics (with fewer privileges than the Union republics). 
It was thus in the 1930s that the RSFSR came to be divided into the Russian core and the non-
Russian periphery. Yet, this republic still did not enjoy the institutional framework that existed 
in the other Union republics, as it continued to lack such institutions as the Russian Communist 
Party or the Russian Academy of Sciences. Instead, the Russians were expected to perceive 
pan-Soviet institutions as appropriate channels for the articulation of their interests.7  
Furthermore, the Russian language and culture began to be glorified as the basis for Soviet 
unity. In the historical narrative constructed in the 1930s, the Russians became first among 
equals in the family of Soviet nationalities, selflessly providing fraternal help to the non-
Russian peoples. Russian culture was proclaimed to be the most progressive in the world and 
the USSR was presented as a continuation of Russian statehood dating back to medieval Kievan 
Rus. Even though the description of these policies by the Russian émigré sociologist Nicholas 
Timasheff as the ‘Great Retreat’ is often repeated, in fact, they were not a return to pre-
revolutionary Russian values. Instead, these policies reflected a selective co-optation of pre-
revolutionary narratives, once those Russian traditions and institutions (e.g. the Orthodox 
Church or the peasant culture) that the regime viewed as politically threatening had been 
undermined or altogether destroyed.8 
The Stalinist discourse crudely divided the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’. It should be 
remembered that national narratives generally tend to feature unflattering images of the ‘Other’. 
Yet the demonisation of the ‘Other’, depicted as numerous external and internal enemies 
plotting to harm the state and its people, was exceptionally powerful in Stalin’s period. The 
history of Russia was presented as a perennial ‘heroic battle for independence and freedom 
against innumerable enemies, conquerors and invaders...’9 These interpretations were widely 
disseminated through the educational system and mass culture from the 1930s onwards and 
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provided the basis for the development of modern mass forms of Russian national identity as, 
in the 1930s, the state finally achieved the levels of industrialisation and literacy essential for 
the formation of such identity.10  
World War II was a key episode in identity formation among all the nationalities of the 
USSR. The war and the Soviet victory reinforced the juxtaposition of the Soviet Union to the 
outside (capitalist, Western) world and the perception of the political leadership and strong state 
as the only forces capable of protecting the people from numerous threats. The victory 
presented the Soviet leadership with an opportunity to construct a coherent pan-Soviet identity, 
which could transcend and overpower sub-state ethnonational affiliations, yet this opportunity 
was missed.11 The authorities used the upsurge of patriotism generated by the war in order to 
promote the officially-sponsored version of it, understood as the people’s unquestioned loyalty 
to political leaders. Within this version of Soviet patriotism, the Russians were allotted an even 
greater role than in the 1930s as, in May 1945, Stalin claimed that they ‘were the greatest nation 
of all the nations’ of the Soviet Union. Within the context of the two ideological campaigns 
which began in 1947 and 1949 respectively, against ‘kowtowing before the West’ and against 
cosmopolitanism (with a strong anti-Semitic character), the supremacy of the Russians within 
the USSR and internationally was emphasized. 12  Accompanied by repressions and 
discrimination of different groups of society from ethnic minorities to those invalided as a result 
of the war, such policies, unwittingly, facilitated societal fragmentation, rather than the 
consolidation of a compound state-framed identity. 
On the one hand, Stalin’s policies had a formative impact on how the Russians have viewed 
themselves ever since. At the same time, the crudeness, brutality and inconsistencies of these 
policies provoked dissatisfaction among the Russians and non-Russians alike. The 
underdevelopment of the RSFSR’s institutional framework as a channel for the articulation of 
Russian national interests continued to be seen by some as anti-Russian discrimination. The 
Stalinist interpretations of Russian history and cultural traditions, as well as Stalin’s policies, 
were interpreted by some intellectuals as highly detrimental to the Russians as a nation. In turn, 
the same policies could be and were interpreted as Russification and a reflection of the inferior 
status of the non-Russian nationalities.  
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As, following the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, the room for the articulation of public 
opinion broadened somewhat, two intertwined trends of major significance for the formation 
of Russian national identity became visible. One was a bolder articulation by the non-Russian 
elites of their republic-specific interests. The other was the emergence of what could be termed 
as a Russian nationalist movement. One of the results of the first trend was that by the late 
1960s ethnic Russians residing in the non-Russian republics could no longer necessarily enjoy 
privileges in accessing higher education and desirable jobs. Instead, priority began to be given 
to these republics’ titular nationalities. By the 1970s, for the first time since the nineteenth 
century, Russians began to migrate back to ‘Russia proper’ from the non-Russian peripheries; 
this development fed into the argument that Russians were discriminated against in the USSR.  
The second trend was marked by the appearance of a numerically significant group of 
Russian intellectuals who openly admitted that for them the loyalty to the Russian nation was 
separate from and took precedence over Soviet patriotism and could be in conflict with it. This 
new post-Stalinist Russian national(ist) discourse was heterogeneous. The views of Russian 
nationalist intellectuals ranged from those similar to the crude, anti-Semitic and anti-Western 
versions of Russian identity formulated during Stalin’s anti-cosmopolitan campaign to a liberal 
vision of Russia as part of Europe, whose advocates condemned Stalinism.13 Novel features of 
this Russian nationalist movement, with particular significance for future developments under 
Mikhail Gorbachev and post-1991, included the drawing of a distinction between ‘the Russian 
national homeland’ and the USSR and the questioning of whether the Soviet Union offered the 
framework conducive to the development of the Russians as a nation. New ways of identifying 
‘significant Others’, to whom the Russians were contrasted, were also articulated. It was in this 
period that the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as Islam as a religion, were 
added by some conservative nationalist authors to the arsenal of Russia’s ‘long-established 
enemies’ such as the West or Jews.14 Not only the underground press, but also the official media 
reflected these intellectual debates on Russianness.  
Some influential members in the CPSU offered patronage to certain groups in the Russian 
nationalist movement despite its members’ critical assessment of various aspects of Soviet 
policies. Yitzhak Brudny suggested that the Soviet leadership tried to co-opt anti-Western 
aspects of the Russian nationalist ideology for legitimising anew the weakening Soviet 
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regime.15 Nonetheless, scholars have argued retrospectively that, in fact, the emergence of the 
Russian nationalist movement in the post-Stalin period posed a greater threat to the unity of the 
USSR than the increased assertiveness of the non-Russian nationalities.16  
Indeed, in the course of Gorbachev’s perestroika, the RSFSR, led by Boris Yeltsin, had 
become a driving force in the process of the USSR’s disintegration. The fact that, by 1990, 
conservative Russian nationalists joined forces with anti-reform members of the Communist 
Party in a campaign to preserve the Soviet Union, as well as the nature of the relationship 
between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, prompted some scholars to interpret the role of the RSFSR in 
the demise of the Soviet Union as accidental. Yeltsin’s position had nothing to do with Russian 
nationalism, but instead was determined entirely by his personal ambition of rustling supreme 
power from Gorbachev, it was concluded. Acting opportunistically in this personal power 
struggle, Yeltsin pitted the RSFSR (metropole) against the Soviet Union (empire), thus 
unwittingly engendering a unique situation when a metropole itself facilitated the imperial 
disintegration.17 In fact, ‘the uniqueness’ of the position of the ‘Russian metropole’ in 1990 and 
1991 simply underscored the difficulty of applying to the Soviet Union the analytical models 
based on the experiences of Europe’s colonial empires. As scholars such as Brubaker and Terry 
Marin showed particularly well, the Soviet Union’s nationalities policies were highly unusual, 
if not unique.  
First, these policies facilitated the peaceful nature of the Soviet Union’s collapse, as they 
forged ‘national units’ into which the country could disintegrate and legitimised their borders 
in the eyes of the population. Secondly, Soviet policies shaped the options which Yeltsin and 
his supporter, the Democratic Russia movement, used in their struggle against the Soviet centre 
in 1990 and 1991. Indeed, during the republican parliamentary elections in 1990, the 
Democratic Russia appropriated the arguments of Russian nationalists about the discrimination 
against the Russians in the USSR on the grounds that, in contrast to other major nationalities, 
the Russians did not have a set of institutions specifically designed to represent their national 
interests. Against the rapidly deteriorating economic situation in the last years of the USSR’s 
existence, the representation of the RSFSR as a milking cow which fed the non-Russians at the 
expense of the well-being of the Russian population, articulated by Russian nationalists in the 
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1970s, looked convincing to many members of the electorate. At the same time, the new Russia 
pictured by Yeltsin and the Democratic Russia was to be a European state, and a democracy 
with a market economy. Thus, in 1990, the two trends hitherto promoted often in separation 
from each other by Russian intellectuals – one dwelling on the specific needs of the Russians 
and separating ‘Russia’ from the USSR and another calling for democratic and market-oriented 
reforms and integration into European institutional structures – were effectively merged 
together. The individual components of the programme reinforced each other’s attractiveness 
in the eyes of the Russian electorate, ensuring that the Democratic Russia became the largest 
faction in the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies, of which Yeltsin became chairman. In 
his first address to the Congress in May 1990, Yeltsin maintained that the Union’s institutional 
structures failed to serve Russia’s interests. ‘Russia must have … real sovereignty and its own 
domestic and foreign policies’, he insisted.18 The RSFSR Declaration of Sovereignty was soon 
adopted by the Congress, speeding up the disintegration process. The August coup of 1991 was 
also used by Yeltsin to promote a vision of Russia separate from the USSR and a republic 
particularly exploited and threatened by the Soviet (‘imperial’) centre.  
And yet, the separation of sub-state national homelands from the USSR was not complete 
when the Soviet state ceased to exist in 1991. The process of separation was particularly 
unfinished in the case of the Russian Federation (RF). Even if in 1990 and 1991 the vision of 
Russia separate from the Soviet Union and a victim of the Union centre was relatively popular 
among the electorate, the RF was less obviously a national homeland of the Russian people 
than were the former non-Russian republics for their titular nationalities. The difference was a 
direct result of the contradictory Soviet policies which, while giving grounds for separating 
Russia from the Union, simultaneously encouraged the identification of the Russians with the 
entire USSR. The Russian historical narrative, effectively disseminated by the educational 
system, emphasised that the national specificity of the Russians lay in their role as the creators 
of a vast multi-national state.   
 
Nation-Building under Yeltsin 
 
This Soviet legacy explains why, in the aftermath of the USSR’s demise, the vision of the 
RF, within the 1991 borders, as a national homeland for its citizens was contested by the elites 
and questioned by the broader public more vigorously than it was the case in most other newly 
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independent states. The position of the Russians at the centre of a huge multi-national state 
made it exceptionally hard to define the membership and ‘national space’ of the Russian nation 
once this state ceased to exist. Was the Russian Federation a nation-state-in-making or a multi-
national state, a mini version of the USSR? The RF inherited from the Soviet period ethnic 
autonomies institutionalised and perceived by ‘titular nationalities’ as national homelands of 
and for those nationalities. At the same time, ethnic Russians constituted 82 percent of the RF’s 
population, whereas in the USSR their proportion stood at just over 50 percent. So, what role 
should ethnic Russians play in the newly independent Russian Federation? 
Retrospectively we can note that the first post-communist Russian leadership, preoccupied 
with economic issues, underestimated the importance of identity politics. In the early post-
communist period, in stark contrast to the deep-rooted collectivistic visions, Russian reformers 
perceived post-communist Russia as simply a collection of individuals who pursued their own 
interests. In fact, theorists of democratisation argue that the articulation of a viable national 
identity, which ensures that state borders are accepted as legitimate national boundaries by the 
population and that the membership of a nation is clearly defined, is essential for the success 
of democratic reforms. Before such reforms could be implemented, a community to be 
reformed has to be clearly defined in terms of territory and membership. A coherent liberal 
national ideology could also help society cope with the difficulties of the transition period.19   
Instead, Yeltsin’s leadership pursued short-term, reactive policies in the sphere of nation-
building, allowing conservative Russian nationalists – those defeated in the 1990 Russian 
parliamentary elections, the Russian Communist Party, now promoting Russian nationalist 
rather than communist ideology, and Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s populist and xenophobic Liberal 
Democratic Party – to take a lead in the construction of discourses of Russian nationhood. 
Numerous definitions of Russian nation- and statehood were articulated in the 1990s. These 
included the identification of Russia with the Soviet Union. In this vision, Soviet 
representations of the state and of the role of the Russians in its formation merged together with 
the above-mentioned Eurasian vision. Indeed, from 1992, the demise of the USSR, for which 
the Russian Congress of People’s Deputies voted overwhelmingly in December 1991, started 
to be seen by many parliamentarians as a catastrophe. The independence of Ukraine, whose 
capital of Kiev has featured in the Russian national historical narrative as the centre of the first 
Russian state, proved particularly difficult to accept. And thus definitions of the Russian nation 
                                               
19 Ghia Nodia, ‘'Nationalism and Democracy’, in Larry Diamond and Mark Plattner, eds., Nationalism, 
Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp.3-22. 
 
29 
which included Ukrainians and other East Slavs, Belarusians, also started to be articulated. 
Another key point of contention was the inclusion into the state of Ukraine of the Crimea, the 
region perceived even by many Russian liberals as a particularly component of the imagined 
Russian national space.20 The demise of the Soviet Union left 30 million Russian speakers 
outside the borders of the RF. By 1993 a powerful discourse had crystallised, representing these 
Russian speakers as an inseparable part of the Russian nation, whose interests the RF 
government was obliged to represent.  
As to what nationalities policies to pursue inside the RF, proposals ranged from dissolving 
non-Russian autonomies to creating an ethnic Russian republic within the federation, thus 
making the status of the Russians clearer and more comparable to those of other major 
nationalities. Furthermore, groups preaching racial purity and defining Russians by blood ties 
also became vocal. Within the RF’s non-Russian ethnic republics, nation-building was 
vigorously promoted by the local elites largely in line with the Soviet nationalities policies (the 
construction of primordially defined ethnocultural identities at the sub-state level) with the 
incorporation into new national discourses of the criticism of the pre-revolutionary and Soviet 
‘Russian imperialism’ and Russification.21  
All these definitions of national identities could find predecessors in earlier intellectual and 
political traditions.22 Only one definition of the Russian nation articulated in that period was 
novel. This was the concept of a civic rossiiskaia nation as a community of citizens of the RF 
(within the 1991 borders) regardless of their ethnicity. Its main promoter, Valerii Tishkov, 
ethnographer and head of the State Committee on Nationalities in 1992, dismissed the Soviet 
equation of nationality (nationalnost) with people’s ethnic affiliations, insisting that it should 
be understood as citizenship.23   
The debates on nation-building were driven by the media and members of the opposition, 
well represented in the parliament since 1993. The policies of Yeltsin’s administration were 
fluctuating and reactive. The 1991 citizenship law promoted a de-ethnicised version of Russian 
identity, as it did not even require the knowledge of the Russian language in order to qualify 
for citizenship. At the same time, the law closely identified Russia with the Soviet Union as it 
allowed any former Soviet citizen an easy access to Russian citizenship. In 1993, under pressure 
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from the opposition, Yeltsin’s government began depicting Russian speakers throughout the 
former USSR as an inseparable part of the Russian nation. During the 1996 presidential election 
campaign, in which Yeltsin was challenged by the opposition leader, the Communist Gennadii 
Ziuganov, the president advocated the closer integration of Russia with the CIS countries, and 
particularly with Ukraine and Belarus.  
The new assertiveness of non-Russian autonomies, and even of some Russian regions, was 
dealt with by the Yeltsin administration through the policies of ‘asymmetric federalism’, 
involving the signing of bilateral treaties which specified different terms in the relationship 
between Moscow and the RF’s constituent units. At the same time, under the influence of his 
liberal advisers, the Yeltsin administration also promoted the concept of rossiiskaia natsiia as 
a community of citizens regardless of their ethnicity. The definition of the national community 
in the 1993 Russian constitution and a search for the ‘Russian idea’, launched by Yeltsin in 
1996, reflected the confusion among the elites in thinking about the post-communist Russian 
identity.24  
 
Nation-Building Post-1999  
 
Russian nation-building in the new millennium could only be understood against the 
background of the legacies of the Soviet period and of Yeltsin, which Putin chose to interpret 
in a particular way. Scholars agree that he assumed power having already formed a vision of 
what he wanted to achieve for Russia.25 They differ, however, in their assessment of the nature 
of his nation-building project. Some scholars suggest that the second president tried to rebuild 
Russia on Soviet and pre-revolutionary imperial foundations, 26  others insist that Putin’s 
rhetoric about civic nation and Russia’s European orientation should be taken seriously in the 
assessment of the formation of Russia as a nation post-1999; and still others focus on the 
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promotion of ethnic Russian component by Russia’s current political elites.27 It is argued here 
that novel elements in Putin’s approach to nation-building have been very strong, even though 
his administration has borrowed widely from the arsenal of long-existing approaches to dealing 
with the nationalities question.  
From the start Putin’s policies were a reaction to the perceived failures of Yeltsin’s 
administration. In 2000, the Council for Foreign and Defence Policy, set up in the 1990s as an 
advisory body to the president, published a report on the problems facing Russia. It flagged up 
the weakness of the state, blamed on Yeltsin’s policies, as the main threat to Russia’s security 
and people’s well-being.28 At the same time, Putin was well aware that the Soviet policies 
created conditions for the USSR’s eventual disintegration along ethnic lines. The war in 
Chechnya, which facilitated Putin’s rise to presidency in 1999, seemed to have confirmed in 
his mind the view that Soviet ethnic federalism, exacerbated by Yeltsin’s asymmetric 
federalism, continued to pose a danger to Russia’s unity.  
In fact, Russia’s ethnic autonomies never enjoyed the same rights as the USSR’s Union 
republics. National institutions of the former were less developed, they were economically even 
more dependent on the centre, and their population was far more Russified. The lesser ability 
of the RF’s ethnic republics to act as national homelands of their titular nationalities, as 
compared to the USSR’s Union republics, could be interpreted in two ways. It could be seen as 
indicating that the danger of disintegration was lower in the RF than was the case with the 
Soviet Union. Alternatively, it could be assumed that, if Russia’s disintegration were to occur, 
in contrast to the peaceful developments in 1991, the process would be violent, as the potential 
disintegration lines would be more vigorously contested. The Putin administration chose to 
highlight the second interpretation, thus depicting Russia as highly insecure.29 Last, but not 
least, Putin agreed with the view that the Soviet policies and the developments in the first post-
communist decade left the role of ethnic Russians within a multi-ethnic state unresolved.  
The strengthening of the state, understood as the ability of the leadership in Moscow to 
control all aspects of the country’s political and public life, became Putin’s priority. It was to 
be achieved by, among other things, the construction of a compound identity for the peoples of 
Russia with the help of a dominant discourse of nation-building. This discourse was to be 
disseminated through speeches by politicians, the educational system (to be put under greater 
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central control than had been the case under Yeltsin), through the media (whose independence 
Putin curtailed), the adoption of state symbols (on which Yeltsin’s government and the 
parliamentary opposition could not agree) and the introduction of new public holidays. The 
levels of attention that the Putin administration paid to the formation of a new identity among 
Russia’s citizens could be compared to those in Stalin’s period, far surpassing any efforts at 
nation-building in the 1990s. Yet, in contrast to the Soviet period, the compound identity was 
expected to be national, rather than supranational, with nation-state-building in Western Europe 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries serving as an example.30 In an another difference with 
the Soviet period, despite Putin’s policies of controlling the media and silencing the opposition, 
discourses of identity, overtly critical of the one emanating from the Kremlin, could be 
articulated publicly.  
We will now look at the nature and methods of the dissemination of the official discourse, 
as represented by the pronouncements of Putin and members of his administration, as well as 
those of leaders of the party of power, the United Russia. We will then consider wider public 
debates about how the Russian nation is to be defined and assess the perceptions of Russian 
national identity among the broader public.  
 
Official Discourse 
 
Since 2000, the presidential administration has put major efforts into the construction of a 
new discourse of Russian identity (rossiiskaia identichnost) which is, on the one hand, post-
communist and, on the other, uses Soviet-style, indeed Stalinist devices, to emphasize the 
importance of a strong state (gosudarstvennost). Putin, his temporary successor Dmitrii 
Medvedev, and members of the government have been insisting that Russia is no longer 
interested in inventing its own models of modernity. Upon assuming supreme power, Putin 
defined the Soviet period as ‘decades [when the country was] heading away from the main road 
of civilisation towards a dead end’. 31  In 1991, the Russian people made a new choice, 
embracing democracy and the market economy and rejecting isolationism and messianism.32 
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Putin’s Russia wanted to project its power through economic means, not by exporting 
ideology.33 It is erroneous to believe that the ‘democratic’ features of the official discourse are 
aimed exclusively at a foreign audience.34 In fact, they have been articulated in politicians’ 
speeches domestically and promoted in a new Russian history textbook, published in 2007 with 
the Kremlin’s explicit approval.35 
This discourse emphasised that democracy was Russia’s own choice at the time when the 
USSR willingly ended, rather than lost, the Cold War.36 Both Putin and Medvedev praised the 
1993 constitution as an important step towards democracy. In his first address to the Federal 
Assembly in November 2008, Medvedev argued that this constitution marked a major break 
with the past, as for the first time in Russian history ‘an individual … his life, his rights and 
property’ were proclaimed ‘to be the highest value’.37 And yet, Yeltsin’s government failed to 
take advantage of these major developments. It acted as if Russia in the 1990s was Germany in 
1945, it has been argued. Under Yeltsin, the Russian state weakened to the extent that the 
United States was, in effect, permitted to determine Russia’s policies. This state of dependency 
began already under Gorbachev, it has been maintained. The reforms, formulated with the help 
of foreign advisers who pursued their own goals, were imposed on the Russian people, without 
consent. Thus, Yeltsin’s period was another revolution from above. Putin, in contrast, restored 
Russia’s status as a great power to be reckoned with in the international arena. He repudiated a 
revolutionary approach, aiming to introduce change according to Russia’s own historical 
traditions.38 Since 2006, Putin’s policies started to be defined as ‘sovereign democracy’. The 
inventor of the term, the then deputy head of the presidential administration, Vladislav Surkov, 
argued that ‘sovereign democracy’ referred to the situation in which the Russian government 
and the Russian (rossiiskaia) nation alone, without foreign interference, determine the 
country’s policies. Surkov went on to explain: 
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We have no intention of inventing a specific Russian (rossiiskaia) 
democracy… At the same time, it is clear that the principles of 
democracy should be in line with the current developmental level of 
Russian society....39 
 
In this discourse, ‘significant Others’, against whom post-Yeltsin’s Russia is imagined, are 
clearly pin-pointed and often demonised. A tendency towards ‘othering’ in the construction of 
national identities is not specifically Soviet or Russian, as some of Putin’s critics argue.40 
However, certain methods employed by the Putin administration to construct Russia’s ‘Others’ 
have been influenced by Soviet practices. Under Putin, ‘the West’, particularly the United 
States of America, again became Russia’s ‘significant Other’, with the anti-Western stance 
hardening  particularly after Putin’s re-election as president for the third term in 2012.41 
Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s governments have been consistently presented as pawns in the hands 
of a ‘new Western colonialism’ and regularly contrasted to Putin’s.42 And yet, Putin has stated 
on more than one occasion that Russia is part of Europe; the above-mentioned Kremlin-
sanctioned history textbook also defined Russia as a major European power.43  
The criticism and occasional demonisation of ‘the West’ and the identification of Russia as 
Europe should not be seen as an irreconcilable contradiction. The idea that Europe is not 
identical to its Western core dates back to the eighteenth century and, as Larry Wolff 
demonstrated, was a response of intellectuals in the eastern periphery of Europe to the invention 
by the West European elites of the category of ‘Eastern Europe’ as a realm between civilisation 
and barbarism. By separating Europe and ‘the West’, the ‘East European’ elites thus resisted 
the ‘Orientalisation’ of their societies by ‘the West’. 44  At the same time, the Putin 
administration used Soviet, even Stalinist, methods of othering. Since 2004, following the 
Beslan hostage-taking crisis and the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the image of 
Russia as historically surrounded by external enemies who relied on internal collaborators in 
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order to destroy Russia, began to be evoked regularly by Putin’s government. This approach 
achieved its apogee at the time of Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. In his public 
addresses, Putin paraphrases Stalin’s speeches to depict Russia as a country whose threatened 
security could be defended only by a strong political leadership commanding unreserved 
loyalty from its people.45 In rhetoric reminiscent of the Stalin period, ‘internal enemies’ have 
been identified as a major threat. Diverse constituencies, from the so-called Chechen fighters 
(boeviki) to non-governmental organisations and human rights groups, are lumped together and 
depicted as anti-Russian and unpatriotic. These internal enemies, it has been argued, are ‘fed 
by the alien hand’, ranging from ill-defined ‘international terrorism’ to the US administration.46 
Until the annexation of Crimea, both Putin and Medvedev were, paradoxically, more 
consistent than the Yeltsin administration in asserting that Russia’s current borders should be 
accepted as legitimate by the political elites and the public, even though the disintegration of 
the USSR was at one point described by Putin as a tragedy.47 Between 2000 and 2014, the 
Russian legislation was revised in order to promote more consistently than before the concept 
of the multi-ethnic, state-framed (rossiiskaia) nationhood within the current borders of the RF. 
The 2002 Russian citizenship law, in comparison with its 1991 predecessor, significantly 
reduced special privileges of former Soviet citizens in obtaining Russian citizenship.48  A 
particularly clear definition of how the Putin administration wanted to define the Russian nation 
could be found in the law ‘On the Foundations of the State Policies on Interethnic Relations’, 
which was intended to replace the 1996 governmental ‘Concept of the State Nationalities 
Policies’. By the end of 2006, the new governmental line had crystallised. The main goal of the 
nationalities policies was defined as ‘the establishment of pan-civic identity 
(obshchegrazhdanskaia identichnost), which presupposes ‘the understanding by citizens of the 
RF of their belonging to the [state-framed, rather than ethno-cultural] Russian nation 
(rossiiskaia natsiia)’. The nation itself was defined as ‘a historically formed socio-political 
community of the multinational people (mnogonatsionalnyi narod) of Russia [united] by 
common historical memories [and] efforts to build a strong indivisible (edinoe) state’. Most 
significantly, in comparison with the earlier versions of this law and with Yeltsin’s nationalities 
policies concept, the draft law put to the parliament in the autumn of 2006 downplayed the 
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special status of ethnic Russians. They were no longer defined as ‘the foundation of the state’ 
(opora gosudarstva) and the only state-bearing people (gosudarstvoobrazuiushchii narod) in 
the RF, as had been the case in the earlier legislation. Instead, the role of all the nationalities of 
the RF in the creation of the Russian state was emphasized. Nevertheless, the role of ethnic 
Russians continued to be defined differently from that of other peoples, as it was the Russians 
who provided ‘the social, linguistic and cultural basis of the [state-framed] civic Russian 
nation’.49 Furthermore, in the first decade of the new millennium the Russian government 
introduced a range of reforms implicitly aimed at reducing the political salience of ethno-
nationalism among non-Russian minorities.50 
Russia’s response to the fall of the pro-Russian government in Ukraine in 2014, which 
included the Crimea annexation and the sponsoring of anti-Kiev separatists in Donbass, 
facilitated further twists in official Russian discourse of nationhood. Russian neo-imperialism 
emerged as a powerful interpretative frame among academics, as well as Russian oppositional 
and Western politicians and journalists alike to explain the Kremlin’s actions.51  Significantly, 
however, Putin’s references to Russia’s imperial heritage and  claims about a particular 
closeness of the Russian and Ukrainian people notwithstanding, Putin’s own speeches, as well 
as Russian state television coverage of the annexation, explicitly rejected the neo-imperial 
frame. Instead, official narratives about the annexation represented it as a unification of the 
Russian nation within a single state. In this context, the Russian nation was defined in ethno-
lingual and ethno-cultural terms, implying the lack of plans for further territorial expansion 
beyond Crimea.52  
The official discourse of Russian nationhood has been thus ridden with contradictions. It 
promotes a range of conflicting interpretations of the relationship between contemporary 
Russian statehood and the Soviet and pre-revolutionary states. On the one hand, post-
communist Russia is depicted as a direct continuation of the Soviet and tsarist statehoods. On 
the other, the emergence of the independent Russian Federation in 1991 and the adoption of the 
1993 constitution are presented as a decisive break with the earlier approaches to state- and 
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nation-building. On the one hand, echoing Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Putin condemned the 
Soviet experiment as ‘a dead end’. On the other, he explicitly utilized the rhetoric of the Stalin 
period, and the Kremlin-sanctioned history textbook depicts Stalin as the most effective 
Soviet/Russian leader of the twentieth century.53   The discourse of the multi-ethnic civic 
Russian nation of the first decade of the new millennium, post-2012 has been replaced with the 
discourse which foregrounds the ethocultural component of nationhood and represents the 
Russian Federation as, above all, the state of ethnic Russians. At the same time, this latter 
discourse has been articulated within the context of policies that are aimed at regaining parts of 
Russia’s former imperial domains.  
Further inconsistencies in the official discourse have been introduced by the vision of 
Russia promoted by the United Russia party, which offers consistent support to Putin’s 
government. The party platform depicts Russia not as part of Europe, but as a unique, self-
sufficient Eurasian civilisation with ‘a special humanitarian mission… to unite organically 
different poles of world civilisation’. The party insists that the role of ethnic Russians in the RF 
needs to be considered with an open mind, and not necessarily in line with the state law on 
interethnic relations.54 
To merge different pasts and other elements of Russian national tradition into a single 
contemporary national narrative has been, of course, the intention of the Putin administration. 
It was already reflected in the adoption in 2000 of state symbols which creatively combined 
Soviet and tsarist elements. In the manifestation of this approach, 7 November (the date 
marking the 1917 Bolshevik revolution) was, under Putin, abolished as a public holiday, while 
Soviet-style military parades on Red Square to mark the Soviet victory in the Second World 
War were restored. Indeed, the role of the war as a major nation-building event has been 
reaffirmed.55  
These attempts to create new collective memories and symbols of the nation for 
contemporary Russia have been only partially successful. While under Yeltsin no agreement 
could be reached regarding state symbols, under Putin the parliament finally approved the 
symbols which the president favoured. Overall, however, the contradictory nature of Putin’s 
nation-building project has not been conducive to the societal consolidation which he aimed to 
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achieve. Moreover, the rhetoric of civic nationhood has been consistently undermined by the 
use of crude devices to picture the world and Russia itself as sharply divided into ‘us’ and ‘them’ 
and by policies which have curtailed the freedom of the media, reduced the role of elections, 
particularly at the regional level, suppressed the opposition and non-governmental 
organisations and subjected civilians in Chechnya to constant violence. The neo-imperial nature 
of the annexation of Crimea and its simultaneous representation by the most influential state 
media outlets in ethnonational terms further undermine the project of civic nation-building. The 
very use of the word ‘civic’ in the definition of the nation is somewhat misleading. Putin’s 
‘civic nation’ does not acknowledge the role of civil society, but is defined almost exclusively 
by the people’s involvement in state-building. In fact, manifestations of extreme ethnic 
nationalism among the ethnic Russian majority and non-Russian minorities not only failed to 
diminish, but by 2010 seemed to be on the rise.  
Within the context of the contradictory official discourse of Russian nationhood and a direct 
clash between important elements of this discourse and actual policies, various symbolic actions 
which the government initiates with the view of consolidating society end up highlighting societal 
divisions. A case in point are the divergent interpretations of a new national holiday, the Day of 
National Unity (4 November), introduced in 2005 to commemorate the defeat by the Russian 
popular militia of ‘foreign interventionists’ who occupied Moscow in 1612. Since the nineteenth 
century the events of 1612 have been depicted in the Russian intellectual tradition as a milestone 
in the construction of national identity, being interpreted as an example of the defence by popular 
efforts of Russia’s independence and of the restoration of order, following the so-called Time of 
Troubles. Explaining the rationale for introducing the new holiday, the Putin administration 
argued that in 1612 various nationalities of Russia, already a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional 
state, took part in the restoration of Russian statehood. Direct parallels with contemporary Russia 
were obvious. Under Putin, as in 1612, Russia restored its sovereignty in relation to the 
interfering Western powers. (In 1612, the invaders were Poles, who constituted ‘the West’ for 
Rus.) Yeltsin’s period was Russia’s new Time of Troubles.  
Yet, rather than accepting the official interpretation, different groups chose to attribute 
different symbolic meanings to the new holiday, suggesting either civic or ethnic understanding 
of Russian identity. The leader of the liberal Yabloko party, Grigorii Yavlinskii, praised the 
presidential initiative, interpreting the events of 1612 as a ‘celebration of civil society’ and 
rejecting the view that the holiday was anti-Western. In turn, as 4 November was an important 
holiday of the Russian Orthodox Church, and because the established historical narrative of the 
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1612 events emphasized the importance of Orthodoxy in making people rise against the Catholic 
invaders, representatives of the Church appropriated the new holiday to promote a special role of 
Orthodoxy in Russian state- and nation-building. Last but not least, radical Russian nationalist 
and racist groups attempted to stage demonstrations on 4 November to articulate their exclusive 
and xenophobic vision of the Russian nation.56  
 
Public Debates 
 
Public debates over the Russian nationhood intensified since 2000, as various programmes 
of how to create a consolidated state-nation (gosudarstvo-natsiia) on the territory of the RF have 
been articulated by pro-governmental and oppositional think-tanks and intellectuals. The official 
discourse of nation-building is often criticised. Conservatives attack the idea of a state-framed 
multi-ethnic nation (rossiiskaia natsiia) as a variant of ‘the Bolshevik internationalism’, arguing 
that the new Russian statehood should be ethnic and based on the ‘hierarchy of ethnocultural 
values’, i.e. the supremacy of ethnic Russians.57 At the same time, a neo-Eurasian model of 
Russian nationhood remains highly popular, of which the works of Aleksandr Dugin and 
Aleksandr Panarin are particularly indicative. Numerous studies, claiming to represent fruits of 
academic scholarship, talk about Russia as a unique Eurasian civilisation, in whose creation 
special national characteristics of ethnic Russians, including the values of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, played a decisive role. These studies argue that Russia has invented unique models of 
development which are destined to present alternatives to hegemonic, Western forms of 
modernity. Significantly, these theories are disseminated through the educational system, which 
continues to be relatively decentralised.58   
In turn, such liberal academics as sociologist Emil Pain and Tishkov critically note that, rather 
than building a nation-state, the Putin administration has allowed the state to submerge the nation 
(ogosudartvlevonie natsii). In their view, current discourses of nation-state building dwell too 
much on the role of ethnic Russians, thereby both deliberately and unwittingly stimulating the 
growth of xenophobic Russian nationalism and engendering a situation threatening to the non-
Russian minorities. The potential impact of legitimate concerns expressed by liberal observers is 
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weakened by their tendency to view ‘Western’ experiences of nation-building uncritically, as a 
solely bottom-up project of the integration of equal citizens able to freely exercise their choices.59 
The liberals’ tendency to view much of the discussion of the role of ethnic Russians as necessarily 
undermining the RF’s inter-ethnic cohesion and to perceive non-Russian nationalisms only as a 
reaction to ethnic Russian domination further weakens their analysis.  
 
Societal Perception 
 
Societal perceptions of Russian identity have been unsurprisingly influenced by official 
discourses of nationhood. By the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, in line 
with the Kremlin’s position, 88% of those polled in 2019 by the main independent Russian 
polling agency, the Levada Centre, suggested that Russia should always remain a great power 
and 75% of those polled said they believed that the country achieved that status and they were 
particularly proud of it.60 The post-2014 confrontation between Russia and the West around 
Russia’s policies towards Ukraine and the accompanying anti-Western official discourse have 
led to the reversal of public perceptions of Russia as either a European or a non-European nation. 
If in 2008 over half of those polled by the Levada Centre identified Russia as a European nation 
versus 37% who thought it was non-European, in 2019 55% described Russia as a non-European 
nation, versus 36% who perceived Russia as part of Europe.61 At the same time, the influences 
are not unidirectional and it is clear that the Kremlin-sponsored narratives also take into account 
grassroots trends and they are articulated in response to societal expectations. It is noteworthy 
that while celebrating the Crimea annexation, according to opinion polls, most citizens of Russia 
demonstrated no appetite for other territorial expansions.62 This attitude explains why official 
Russian media framed the coverage of the annexation with reference to ethnonational unification 
of the Russians in a very specific context of Crimea, rather than as a neo-imperial project.63 
At the same time, the impact of exclusive ethnic Russian nationalism on society at large 
has grown since 1999, with the trend peaking in 2013, with the subsequent slight decline by the 
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end of that decade. In 2013, as many as 62% of the Levada-Centre respondents feared violent 
inter-ethnic clashes and 54% supported the introduction of policies that would limit the ability 
of people from the Caucasus to live in Russia.64 This is particularly striking, given that North 
Caucasus is part of the Russian Federation and that North Caucasians are citizens of the Russian 
Federation. Again the results of these polls demonstrate the interaction of bottom-up and top-
down identitarian narratives. From the second half of 2012 to the summer of 2013, Russian 
state television channels waged an unprecedented campaign against ‘migrants’. This vaguely 
defined category included Russia’s own citizens from the North Caucasus who moved to reside 
in cities of central Russia, including Moscow. A particularly noticeable upward spike in anti-
migrant and anti-Caucasian feelings in 2013 might well have been connected with this 
campaign and these feelings’ subsequent decline to the campaign’s abrupt end.  However, the 
very campaign that took place within the context of mayoral elections in Moscow was the 
authorities’ attempt to exploit societal xenophobia and prevent the anti-Kremlin nationalist 
opposition from capitalizing on this societal trend.65 
 
Conclusions 
 
The labelling of Putin’s policies as merely neo-imperial or neo-Soviet is not conducive to 
the understanding of the nature of his nation-building project. Since 2000 we have witnessed 
the most consistent and assertive attempt at Russian nation-building ever undertaken by the 
political elites. West-European nation-building models have constituted an important source of 
inspiration. Significantly, governmental advisors have been studying carefully the late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century nation-building experiences in Europe, while current 
trends of identity formation under the impact of the European integration and globalisation 
have been less well appreciated. 66  The reason for this approach is that members of the 
presidential administration believe that, in terms of nation-building, the RF is at an earlier stage 
of development than other European societies. At the same time, it is assumed that being a 
fully-fledged nation is an essential part of European modernity, to which post-communist 
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Russian governments, including Putin’s, see no alternative any rhetoric about Russia’s Eurasian 
identity notwithstanding.  
Notwithstanding major changes which have occurred post-1945 in how the elites and 
peoples in Western Europe define their identities, the impact of the formative times in West 
European nation-building – the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries – is still very 
significant today. In the case of the Russians, these formative times fell on Stalin’s period. So 
it is in fact unsurprising, rather than shocking, that cultural and historical narratives about the 
role of the Russians and the devices for creating the nation’s significant ‘Others’ of that period 
still have a major hold on contemporary Russian politicians and members of society, whose 
formative years were in Soviet times. The ambiguous position of the Russians in the USSR, 
which also crystallised in the 1930s, shaped the dynamics of the Russian nationalist movement 
post-1953 as well as the role of the RSFSR in the demise of the Soviet Union. It continues to 
underline the conflict between the visions of post-communist Russia as either a multi-ethnic 
state of and for all its nationalities or as primarily an ethnic Russian homeland. Putin’s nation-
building project placed this conflict at the centre of public debates, but did not make its 
resolution any more achievable.  
 
